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Building Robust Deep Neural Networks for Road
Sign Detection
Arkar Min Aung,Yousef Fadila, Radian Gondokaryono, Luis Gonzalez
Abstract—Deep Neural Networks are built to generalize outside of training set in mind by using techniques such as regularization,
early stopping and dropout. But considerations to make them more resilient to adversarial examples are rarely taken. As deep neural
networks become more prevalent in mission critical and real time systems, miscreants start to attack them by intentionally making deep
neural networks to misclassify an object of one type to be seen as another type. This can be catastrophic in some scenarios where
the classification of a deep neural network can lead to a fatal decision by a machine. In this work, we used GTSRB dataset to craft
adversarial samples by Fast Gradient Sign Method [1] and Jacobian Saliency Method [2], used those crafted adversarial samples to
attack another Deep Convolutional Neural Network and built the attacked network to be more resilient against adversarial attacks by
making it more robust by Defensive Distillation [3] and Adversarial Training [1].
Index Terms—Road Sign Classification, GTSRB Dataset, Non-targeted Adversarial Attack, Target Adversarial Attack, Adversarial
Sample Crafting, Defensive Distillation, Adversarial Training, Robust Deep Neural Networks.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
With the availability of more computational resources and
abundance of data, there has been a huge resurgence of
using deep neural networks to do object recognition and
classification but several machine learning models, includ-
ing state-of-the-art deep neural networks, consistently mis-
classify adversarial examples, which are inputs formed by
applying small, but intentionally engineered, worst-case
perturbations to input images. These perturbations are in-
discernible for humans, but they can make deep neural
networks to make wrong classifications with very high
confidence. The problem becomes more concerning with the
advent of self-driving cars which does automatic detection
and classification of road signs to do path planning, adjust-
ing speed or driving behaviors. If the Convolutional Neural
Network which detects road signs in a self-driving car is
fed with adversarial inputs, even though it is obvious for
a human to classify it correctly, the network may make an
egregious misclassification of that road sign. This can result
in self-driving cars making erroneous decisions.
In this work, ways to create adversarial examples from
road sign images are explored in order to use them to
fool the state-of-the-art neural networks and an effort to
build more robust neural networks to be resilient against
these attacks is made. In Section 2, some of the previous
work that has been done related to adversarial examples is
addressed. Explanations of the methods that were used to
craft adversarial examples and the ways used to build more
robust neural networks to be resilient against adversarial
samples are presented in Section 3. The dataset used and
the data augmentation processes are also described in 3.
Experimental results are shown in Section 4 and finally,
further discussions on the weakness of this work as well
as the possible future extensions of this work are discussed
in Section 5. Finally, the scope of the work is concluded in
Section 6.
2 RELATED WORK
The work by Nguyen et al. [4] was the inception of fooling
state-of-the-art neural networks. In this work, it is shown
that deep neural networks are easily fooled to classify
images which are not recognized by humans as belonging to
particular classes with high confidence. [5] first showed how
state-of-the-art machine learning models, including neural
networks, are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Based on
the work of [5], [1] presented how to generate adversarial
examples with Fast Gradient Sign Method, how adversarial
training can result in further regularization than dropout
and how adversarial examples generalize across different
deep neural network models. [2] further explores the reason
behind adversarial attacks and presented how imperfections
in the training phase of deep neural networks can make
them vulnerable to adversarial samples. [2] formalizes the
space of adversaries against deep neural networks and
introduces a novel class of algorithms to craft adversarial
samples. [6] addressed the issue of black-box adversarial
attacks which aligns with the problem space that our work is
aiming to address. Not only are adversarial samples crafted
by perturbing pixels in the image, [7] and [8] explored
how adversarial examples can be transferred to the physical
world, such as adversarial printed road signs with graffiti
like art on top of it. These road signs seem like they are being
vandalized but for neural networks those graffiti overlays
lead the classification astray from the correct prediction.
Nonetheless, recent work by [9] and [10] stated that stan-
dard detectors such as FasterRCNN [11] and YOLO [12] are
not fooled by physical adversarial stop signs.
Based on the method knowledge distillation described
in [13], Papernot et al proposed a method of making neu-
ral networks more resilient to adversarial samples in [3].
But [14] stated that defense against adversarial samples by
defensive distillation does not work. Since, the field of ad-
versarial sample crafting and defense against adversarial at-
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Fig. 1. Pipeline of methodology implemented in this work of crafting
adversarial samples, attacking state-of-the-art convolutional neural net-
work and building more robust neural network for road sign detection.
tacks is a fairly new research topic in machine learning, there
has been various literature debating on the effectiveness of
different methods. Our work serves as the connecting hub
to tie up different ends of literature both on the attacking
deep neural networks with adversarial samples, defending
against adversarial attacks and verifying whether the defen-
sive methods work on dataset different from datasets used
in literature.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Pipeline
There are three main objectives in this work: building a
state-of-the-art traffic sign classification deep convolutional
neural network, crafting adversarial samples from GTSRB
dataset, fooling the state-of-the-art network and making
the network to be more resilient against the attacks. The
methodology flowchart from Figure 1 depicts the scope of
creating a robust neural network built upon the objectives.
The first objective, which is the first step in our pipeline,
is to build a classifier which has near state-of-the-art per-
formance on test set of GTSRB dataset. In order to satisfy
this objective, we trained and tested a Convolutional Neural
Network (which we will call DeepCNN from now on). The
detailed architecture of DeepCNN is depicted in Table 2.
DeepCNN is trained for 30 epochs with SGD optimizer
with learning rate 0.01, with momentum and learning rate
decay. DeepCNN is the network which the adversary wants
to attack but the architecture, weights and optimizers are
not known by the adversary.
The second objective, which is the second step in our
pipeline, is to craft adversarial samples based on GTSRB
dataset. These adversarial samples are used to attack Deep-
CNN, without knowing its architecture and weights. In
order to craft adversarial examples, another CNN is built.
We call this CNN, AdversarialCNN. Detailed architecture
of AdversarialCNN is depicted in Table 1. AdversarialCNN
is used to craft adversarial samples using Fast Gradient Sign
Method (Section 3.4.1) and Jacobian-based Saliency Map
Method (Section 3.4.2). The adversarial samples generated
are first analyzed whether the perturbations are visually
perceptible and then the best hyperparameters which pro-
duce the least visually perceptible adversarial samples are
picked to generate more samples to attack the DeepCNN.
The final step in our pipeline of this work is to use
two defense against adversarial attacks methods called Ad-
versarial Training (Section 3.5.2) and Defensive Distillation
(Section 3.5.1). These two methods are used to make the
DeepCNN to be more robust against adversarial attacks.
Both DeepCNN and AdversarialCNN are trained from
scratch without their weights being initialization from pre-
trained networks. The reason for training both from scratch
is to emulate the hybrid Black Box attack as close as possible.
Since both models were trained from scratch, each model
does not have any knowledge of the other model. Therefore,
AdversarialCNN is generating samples by only knowing
the input dataset and the output classes of the GTSRB
dataset. The reason that the AdversarialCNN still has the
knowledge of the dataset restricts our approach from having
a full Black Box attack.
The motivation behind building two CNNs with differ-
ent architectures is as follows: assume that an adversary
wants to attack a neural network which is doing a traffic
sign classification in a self-driving car. The adversary does
not know the architecture nor the weights of the neural
network but knows the input and output pairs. For example,
the attacker knows that given a stop sign image, the network
predicts the class label of a stop sign. Therefore, the attacker
will try to build a replica network with different architecture
and try to generate adversarial samples which can poten-
tially attack a deeper, more complex network in a black
box fashion. If we compare the architecture of DeepCNN
(Table 2) and AdversarialCNN (Table 1), it can be seen that
DeepCNN is deeper and has more reprsentational power.
The reason for making AdversarialCNN less complex and
less powerful is to make the task of generating adversarial
examples as hard as possible to attack a deeper and more
complex model. This emulates a more realistic scenario
where a deployed neural network is likely to be more com-
plex when compared to a replica network which a miscreant
would have built for attacking it.
3.2 Dataset
For this work, the German Traffic Sign Recognition Bench-
mark (GTSRB) [15] dataset was used which is popular
benchmark for deep learning problems. This dataset is com-
posed of more than 20, 000 images, each image belonging
to one of 43 classes. The dataset is split into training set and
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Fig. 2. Histogram of samples over 43 classes. Class imbalance is visible
in original dataset (Upper histogram). Histogram of samples over 43
class after data augmentation (Lower histogram). The mean samples
per class is chosen as the cutoff for augmenting samples in classes
which are lower than the mean samples per class.
testing set. Since we are building a Convolutional Neural
Network with fixed input size, it was decided to work with
RGB images of size 32x32. Furthermore, all of the images
with a smaller size were removed. Since there is a high
class imbalance in the training samples which can be seen
in histogram presented in Figure 3, a decision of generating
more data for the classes with a low quantity of samples
was taken.
3.2.1 Data Augmentation
It is well known that the more data machine learning
algorithms have access to, the more effective they are. A
common way of doing data augmentation is by performing
of affine transformations [16] on each image. An affine
transformation is any transformation that can be expressed
as a matrix multiplication and a vector addition. They can be
used to perform rotations, translations and scale operations
on images so they are basically a relation between to images
using the following 2x3 matrix:
M =
[
A B
]
=
[
a00 a01 b00
a10 a11 b10
]
(1)
Fig. 3. Generation of a new training image by the application of an affine
transformation
In order to transform a vector [x, y]T using M , the
following must be done:
xtrans = A
[
x
y
]
+B =M
[
x y 1
]T
(2)
It is possible to generate new training examples by ap-
plying these transformations using M . Since it is infeasible
to generate training data in a manual way, an automatic data
augmentation process was done by applying small random
perturbations to the base points and using these new ones in
order to obtain different transformation matrices. An image
generated by this process is shown in Figure 3.
3.3 Network Architecture
The detailed architectures for AdversarialCNN and Deep-
CNN are described in Table 1 and Table 2. Both networks
take in 3-channel RGB image of width 32 pixels and height
32 pixels. AdversarialCNN is fairly shallow Convolutional
Neural Network compared to DeepCNN. The main moti-
vation behind intentionally making AdversarialCNN less
complex than DeepCNN is depicted in Section 3.1. Deep-
CNN has a penultimate layer called Temperature layer with
tunable parameter T . This layer is the implementation of the
concept depicted in Section 3.5.1.
TABLE 1
Network architecture for AdversarialCNN. This network is used to craft
adversarial samples.
Layer Name Adversarial CNNSpecification
Input Shape: 32x32x3
Conv 1
Kernel Size: 8x8
Number of filters: 64
Stride (x, y): (2, 2)
Padding: zero-padding
Activation ReLU
Conv 2
Kernel Size: 6x6
Number of filters: 128
Stride (x, y): (2, 2)
Padding: No Padding
Activation ReLU
Conv 3
Kernel Size: 5x5
Number of filters: 128
Stride (x, y): (1, 1)
Padding: No Padding
Activation ReLU
Flatten
Dense 1 Nodes: 1024
Output Nodes: 43
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TABLE 2
Network architecture for DeepCNN. This network is the network which
is first attacked by adversarial samples and then made robust by
defensive distillation and adversarial training. Note that the penultimate
layer, Temperature Layer, has the key tunable parameter T to get
entropic softmax outputs.
Layer Name Deep CNNSpecification
Input Shape: 32x32x3
Conv 1
Kernel Size: 3x3
Number of filters: 32
Stride (x, y): (1, 1)
Padding: Zero Padding
Activation ReLU
Conv 2
Kernel Size: 3x3
Number of filters: 32
Stride (x, y): (1, 1)
Padding: Zero Padding
Activation ReLU
Max Pool 1 Window Size: 2x2Stride (x, y): (2, 2)
Dropout 1 Probability: 0.25
Conv 3
Kernel Size: 3x3
Number of filters: 64
Stride (x, y): (1, 1)
Padding: Zero Padding
Activation ReLU
Conv 4
Kernel Size: 3x3
Number of filters: 64
Stride (x, y): (1, 1)
Padding: Zero Padding
Activation ReLU
Dropout 2 Probability: 0.25
Flatten
Dense 1 Nodes: 256
Dropout 3 Probability: 0.5
Dense 2 Nodes: 43
Activation ReLU
Temperature Layer Temp: T
Output 43
3.4 Adversarial Example Crafting
An adversarial sample is an input crafted to impact deep
learning algorithms output integrity. That could be an in-
put that is deliberately built to cause the Artificial Neural
Network to misclassify the input to a different class than
what it is supposed to be or at least to reduce the output
confidence. Such attacks could be targeted or untargeted.
Targeted attack aims to cause a particular output class for an
input while untargeted attack aims to misclassify the output
to any other class regardless what is it. Crafting adversarial
samples do not require any modification of the training
process as they are created after the model has been fully
trained.
The linear structure of most neural networks suggests
weakness to linear perturbations in the images [1]. Equation
3 explains this phenomenon on how a small perturbation
η plus the original image x affects the predictions of a
classifier wT x˜. A larger sized vector results a substantial
change in the classifier.
wT x˜ = wTx+ wT η (3)
Adversarial attacks capabilities could be grouped into
five categories defined by the information held by the ad-
versary [6].
Fig. 4. Fast gradient sign method example of a 20 km/h road sign with
perturbations misclassified as an 80 km/h road sign. The Perturbation
image is normalized amplified data.
1) Training data and network architecture are known
to the adversary
2) Network architecture is known to the adversary but
not the training data
3) Training data is known to the adversary but not the
network architecture
4) Oracle mode: neither training data nor network
architecture is known to the adversary but the ad-
versary has access to the model as an oracle. The
adversary can get output from supplied inputs.
5) Samples mode: the adversary has only a collection
of pairs of input and output related to the classifier.
3.4.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method
Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) is a mathematical
method of generating adversarial examples by derivation of
parameters of the neural network [1]. Equation 4 formulates
this perturbation by taking the derivative of the cost func-
tion J(θ, x, y) to find the direction of the perturbation with
a nominal size of . This cost function is the confidence of
label y of image x. The resulting perturbations ν are added
as in equation 3. Let equation 5 be defined as the gradient
of an image at a certain pixel ix, iy .
η =  ∗ sign(∇ ∗ J(θ, x, y)) (4)
d(θ, x, y, ix, iy) = sign(∇ ∗ J(θ, x, y, ix, iy)) (5)
Figure 4 shows an image example on how equations 3
and 4 generates an adversarial example that misclassifies
the 20 km/h road sign to an 80 km/h road sign. By exami-
nation of the adversarial example itself, a user would have
difficulties discerning whether this is an adversarial image.
Some images of different ’s (in section 4) are perceptible
adversarial examples.
User perceptibly is defined as the ability to perceive an
adversarial attack on an image. For FGSM, user perceptibly
depends on the size of the feature vector and the choice
of the parameter . Here the feature vector is the image
dimension n x n. Imperceptible adversarial examples are
easier to craft from larger dimension images.
3.4.2 Jacobian-based Saliency Map Method
Jacobian-based saliency map method was first introduced
by Papernot et al. [17]. This method is based on identifying
small set of pixels candidates for perturbation in order to
perform a class targeted attack. Equation 6 describes how
Jacobian-based Saliency works. Let F : X ⇒ Y be the
function learned from a trained neural network, where X
is a legitimate sample, Y ∗ is a targeted class and δx is the
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Fig. 5. Jacobian saliency map method example of a 70 km/h speed
limit sign with minimally added perturbations misclassified as a 30km/h
speed limit sign.
small perturbation added to X . The objective is to perform
optimization where δx is minimized and still satisfying the
Equation 6. Figure 5 illustrates this example of adding a
perturbation δx to the original image x.
argmin
δX
‖δX‖ s.t. F(X + δX) = Y∗ (6)
This entails calculating the forward derivative of a neural
network in order to build a saliency map that distinguishes
the potential features for perturbation. Such perturbation
would leads to the desired adversarial output. This ap-
proach is of category 2 attack (the adversary needs to know
the network architecture and weight parameters to craft
adversarial samples). In our research, we were able also to
produce a category 3 attack (training data is known but not
the architecture) with high rate of success by generating the
adversarial samples on different (and simpler) architecture.
To summarize this approach is processed is processed
through these four steps:
1) Compute the Jacobian matrix of F evaluated at
input X .
2) Use Jacobian to find which features of input should
be perturbed .
3) Create X∗ by perturbing the features found in Step
2 on X .
4) Repeat while X∗ is not misclassified and perturba-
tion is still small.
3.4.3 Using Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach to
Craft Category 3 Attacks
As we have mentioned, Jacobian-based saliency map ap-
proach assumes knowing the network architecture and
weight parameters in order to build the saliency map that
identifies the set of input features candidate for perturbation
(category 2 attack). In our research, we show that even
without knowing the network architecture we were able to
craft adversarial samples if we has access to the training
data (Category 3 attack). Even though the attacker does not
know the architecture and weights of the network he wants
to attack, the attacker can build a replica network which
does the same classification task. The attacker would then
be able to craft adversarial samples using his knowledge in
his own network architecture and weights.
3.5 Building Robust Neural Networks
3.5.1 Defensive Distillation
Defensive distillation smooths the models decision surface
in adversarial directions exploited by the adversary [3]. The
idea behind defensive distillation is based on knowledge
distillation which was first coined by Hinton et al. [13].
Knowledge distillation is a training procedure where one
model is trained to produce entropic outputs using the
original one-hot encoded training labels and the second
model uses those entropic soft target outputs as the training
label. In the original work, the main motivation behind
knowledge distillation is to distill the knowledge from big-
ger network to a smaller network which can be deployed on
mobile devices but still having the equivalent representative
power of a bigger network.
In the case of defensive distillation, there is no need
to have a smaller model as the main goal is not compres-
sion but more robust networks. Therefore, in the setting of
defensive distillation, the network of same architecture is
trained twice; first, with the original one-hot encoded labels
to produce entropic predictions by tuning a temperature
parameter (described in next paragraph) and second, using
those entropic soft targets as training labels which are fed
back into the same network and retrained from scratch with
new labels. Distillation makes the final model’s responses
smoother, and therefore, it works even if two models are
of the same size. Using the same network architecture to
product the outputs which will be fed back to the same
network for training may sound counterintuitive but the
reason it works is that the first model is trained with hard
labels (100% probability that an image is a 80km/h road
sign rather than a stop sign) and then provides soft labels
(70% probability that an image is a 80km/h, 20% probability
that an image is a 60km/h, etc) which are used to train
the second model. This implicitly makes the network to be
less confident of its predictions. Having a network with less
confident predictions is useful when the network is making
wrong predictions. It is more desirable to have network
with less confident wrong predictions than a network with
very confident wrong predictions. Even if the network is
making wrong predictions, it is better to make wrong pre-
dictions which are semantically similar to the actual class
or have the actual class showing up as second or third
top prediction. Figure 4.3 (a) and (b) shows the resulting
predictions of a confident network (i.e, network trained
without defensive distillation). Figure 4.3 (c) and (d) shows
the resulting predictions of a less confident network. The
second and third predictions of the less confident network is
more semantically related to the actual class label compared
to the second and third predictions of a very confident
classifier. Therefore, in the setting of adversarial sample
crafting, small tugs of perturbations can lead the network to
make confident incorrect classifications if the adversary can
find the sharp edges in the manifold of the class boundaries.
Temperature: To perform distillation, a Convolutional
Neural Network network whose output layer is a softmax
is first trained on the original dataset. The description of
the original network is described in Section 3.3. Consider
Z(X), the logit outputs produced by the last hidden layer of
the CNN, right being trasformed to normalized probabilities
with softmax function F (X). The outputs obtained from
F (X) describe the probability how likely that dataX is class
N . Within the softmax layer, a given neuron corresponding
to a class indexed by i ∈ 0..N − 1 (where N is the number
of classes, 43 in our case) computes the component i of the
BUILDING ROBUST DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS FOR ROAD SIGN DETECTION 6
following output vector F (X):
F (x) =
[
ezi(X)/T∑N−1
l=0 e
zi(X)/T
]
i∈0...N−1
(7)
The parameter T is a tunable parameter and can be im-
plemented as an additional layer between softmax and final
fully connected layer of the size N nodes. This additional
layer only needs to perform element-wise division to the
output row vector from the fully connected layer.
3.5.2 Adversarial Training
Using adversarial examples generated with Fast Gradient
Sign Method and Jacobian Saliency Map Method, we split
the training adversarial set and testing adversarial set which
is the same as GTSRB dataset train and test split. Training
adversarial samples are fed back in the neural network as
new training samples. Adversarial training is similar to
brute force approach of solving more robust neural net-
works but generating more adversarial samples are expen-
sive and not is not scalable. Therefore, adversarial training
is used as a supplement to help defensive distillation which
is more scalable since it only needs one parameter (temper-
ature T ) to be tuned.
4 RESULTS
Experimental results based on stated methodology are ob-
tained and discussed separately each for adversarial craft-
ing, attack on DeepCNN, Defensive Distillation and Adver-
sarial Training.
4.1 Adversarial Examples: Fast Gradient Sign Method
The adversarial neural network described in section 3.3 was
trained with the GTSRB data. The resulting accuracy of the
network is 93.49%. By back-propagation of the network, we
initiate the fast gradient sign method attack with help of the
Cleverhans library. [18] 23,000 adversarial examples were
generated for each changing parameter  (eq. 4) 0.01 to 0.30
with a step of 0.01.
Figure 6 shows the resulting adversarial examples gen-
erated from 2 images with increasing . The last column
explains whether the image has been either classified or
missclassified. We can see that increasing  changes the
magnitude of perturbation as well as increasing the chances
for misclassification of the image. Let d(θ, x, y, ix, iy) be the
direction of perturbation of each pixel ix, iy as defined in
equation 5. For each changing  in figure 6, we can observe
that the direction of perturbation d(θ, x, y, ix, iy) is constant.
In other words, the perturbed image retained a constant
pattern through each iteration .
Perceptibility means whether a user can classify the
image as an attack on the neural network. The result is
dependent on the image itself and the subjectivity of the
person viewing the image. Compare images 1 and 2 for
 = 0.1. Qualitatively by the authors assessment , the image
on the left is perceptible and the image on the right is
imperceptible.
Another result to consider is shown in Figure 7 which
plots the accuracy of the neural network with increasing
epsilons. Here accuracy is defined based on the number of
images correctly classified from the total of images tests. We
can see an exponential decay of accuracy with increasing ’s.
Fig. 6. Adversarial example images from fast gradient sign method with
increasing parameters . Pixel change pattern is similar for each image.
Magnitudes of the perturbation increase with increasing .
Fig. 7. Accuracy vs  of adversarial examples from fast gradient sign
method. For each , accuracy is tested on the AdversarialCNN with
23,000 adversarial examples. Increasing  exponentially decays the
accuracy of the neural network
4.2 Adversarial Examples: Jacobian Saliency Map
Method
The simple neural network to generate adversarial examples
uses parameters described in section 3.3 trained using the
GTSRB data, three channels RGB. In order to generate
adversarial samples, we first chose 43 samples, one of
each class, and then for each one, we had tried to make
a targeted attack to all other classes. In total we have
generated 43 ∗ 42 = 1806 samples. The success rate, which
is percentage of adversarial samples that were successfully
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Fig. 8. Examples of successfully generated targeted adversarial sam-
ples using Jacobian saliency map method
classified by the DNN as the adversarial target class, was
82%. The distortion, which is percentage of pixels modified
in the legitimate sample to obtain the adversarial sample
was 1.74% in average. Figure 8 shows three examples of
successfully generated targeted adversarial samples
4.3 Deep CNN and Attack on DeepCNN
During the initial training step of DeepCNN, temperature
parameter (T ) is set to 1. When temperature parameter is
set to 1 the Temperature layer (Penultimate layer in Table 2)
is analogous to identity mapping. Moreover, the network
is not restricted to produce entropic softmax predictions
and therefore, after 20 epochs, the network becomes very
confident with its predictions.
The summary of training and testing cross entropy
losses, percent correct accuracy and entropy of softmax pre-
dictions are tabulated in Table 3. Deep CNN achieved high
test accuracy of 98.765%. The entropy of softmax outputs of
training images is 9.79495. This indicates that the network
is very confident not only when it is making correct pre-
dictions but also when it is making wrong predictions. An
example of DeepCNN making very confident predictions
can be seen in Figure 4.3 (a) and (b).
Then we used adversarial examples generated with Fast
Gradient Sign Method and Jacobian Saliency Map Method
to test our DeepCNN. The test accuracy went down to
50.8859% and cross entropy loss rose up to 3.68216. Table 4
summarizes the difference between the test statistics on le-
gitimates samples and adversarial samples. Figure 10 shows
some samples of road signs which were initially correctly
classified but were misclassified when they are perturbed
with Fast Gradient Sign Method and Jacobian Saliency Map
Attack.
This indicates that adversarial examples generate by dif-
ferent network (AdversarialCNN) with no knowledge of the
architecture and weights of another network (DeepCNN),
can still attack the network up to a certain extent. The only
Wild animals crossing = 1.0
Dangerous curve   = 5.0e-16
Bumpy road                = 2.4e-16
Speed limit (120km/h)   = 1.0
Wild animals crossing  = 1.7e-07
Bumpy road                  = 2.4e-16
Speed limit (30km/h)   = 0.7195
Speed limit (70km/h)   = 0.2071
Speed limit (50km/h)   = 0.0428
Speed limit (100km/h)   = 0.811
Speed limit (80km/h)    = 0.1046
Speed limit (30km/h)    = 0.0241
Fig. 9. Examples of confident predictions and less confident predictions.
(a) and (b) are produced by DeepCNN with T = 1. Networks with
high confidence tend to make confident correct predictions as well as
confident wrong predictions. (c) and (d) are produced by DeepCNN with
T = 100. Networks with low confidence tend to make less confident
correct predictions as well as less confident wrong predictions. Even
though the first prediction in (c) is wrong, the prediction is semantically
close to the actual ground truth which shows up as second prediction of
the network.
shard knowledge between two networks is training data
and training labels. This signifies our primary purpose of
trying to attack Deep Neural Networks for a particular clas-
sification works without knowing the architecture, weights
and parameters of that network.
4.4 Defensive Distillation and Adversarial Training
In order to train DeepCNN with defensive distillation, tem-
perature parameter T is set to 100 which forces the network
to produce more entropic outputs. An example of the soft-
max outputs of distilled network can be seen in Figure 4.3
(c) and (d). When trained with defensive distillation, even
when the network is making a mistake (Figure 4.3 (c)), it
is not very far off from the correct prediction. Opposed to
that when the network is trained without distillation, the
network is very confident on the first prediction but the
second prediction is semantically far away from the correct
class (Figure 4.3 (a)).
After training DeepCNN with defensive distillation
method, the network’s output accuracy on test set went
down (Table 3 T = 100 column) but not considerably.
But now the network is making more entropic outputs
as it can be seen in Table 3 Entropy of Training Softmax
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Ahead only [seen as] Go straight or left
Ahead only [seen as] Go straight or left
Road work [seen as] Bicycles crossing
No vehicles [seen as] 70km/h
Yield [seen as] No vehicles
70km/h [seen as] 30km/h
Fig. 10. Adversarial samples successfully fooled the DeepCNN to mis-
classify. Left column: adversarial samples with Jacobian Saliency Map
Method. Right column: adversarial samples with Fast Gradient Sign
Method. The original samples of these road signs were correctly classi-
fied by DeepCNN.
predictions at T = 100 as well as Figure 4.3 (c) and (d). This
indicates that the network is less confident when making
right predictions as well as less confident when it is making
wrong predictions.
Right after the network is trained with defensive dis-
tillation, the network is fed with adversarial training set.
Using the adversarial training set, the network is trained
once again with defensive distillation.
When testing on adversarial samples, the deterioration
of test accuracy and cross entropy loss is less dramatic then
when compared to DeepCNN without defensive distillation
and adversarial training. This effect can be seen in Table 5.
Some of the samples which were misclassifed by DeepCNN
before defensive distillation and adversarial training but got
correctly classified after defensive distillation and adversar-
ial training can be seen in Figure 11.
Defensive distillation smoothen the model learned by a
DeepCNN during training by helping the model generalize
better to samples outside of its training dataset. Distillation
generates smoother classifier models by reducing their sen-
sitivity to input perturbations. These smoother classifiers are
found to be more resilient to adversarial samples and have
improved class generalizability properties. [3]
5 DISCUSSION
The methods of crafting adversarial examples described in
the paper is successful in generating a black box attack on a
Deep neural network. The disadvantages of our method is
the absence of a measurement parameter user perceptibility.
While parameters such as  from FGSM and distortion rate
from Jacobian Saliency can be chosen, the perceptibility
depends on the original image itself. Extensive studies on
parameterizing the perceptibility of adversarial perturba-
Fig. 11. Road sign image that were previously misclassified by Deep-
CNN but then correctly classified after defensive distillation and adver-
sarial training.
tion and increasing/decreasing the feature vector size of the
images can be explored in future work.
Furthermore, more comparisons can be made on visual
differences of the FGSM method and the Jacobian saliency
map method. The first method applies minuscule perturba-
tions to almost all the pixels in the image while the latter
applies very distinct perturbation to only a small amount of
pixels. This can either be advantageous or disadvantageous
depending on the situation. For example in [8], the authors
used more distinct modifications for physical adversarial
examples as it is easier to apply.
Defense against adversarial samples are not analogous to
reducing the variance of the mode by regularization because
adversarial examples are not traditional overfitting problem
[1]. Previous work has showed that a wide variety of tradi-
tional regularization methods including dropout and weight
decay either fail to defend against adversarial examples or
only do so by seriously harming accuracy on the original
task.
Another weakness of making more robust neural net-
works in our work is that after defensive distillation and ad-
versarial training, the test accuracy cannot reach the original
test accuracy on non-adversarial samples. Moreover, early
stopping with respect to a threshold parameter have affects
on how well defensive distillation can work on adversarial
samples.
Since the data that we used for our work is cropped
32x32 images, much research should be done when the
input is the image of the whole scene and only some
perturbations are done around and on the object of interest
in the scene.
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TABLE 3
DeepCNN trained without defensive distillation (T = 1) and with
defensive distillation (T = 100). Temperature parameter T is tuned to
give the best test accuracy while ensuring that the softmax predictions
are as entropic as possible.
T = 1 T = 100
Training Cross Entropy Loss 0.00453 0.20243
Training Accuracy 99.8766% 99.4563%
Testing Cross Entropy Loss 0.05645 0.20855
Testing Accuracy 98.7650% 98.2999%
Testing F1 Score 0.98765 0.98299
Entropy of Training Softmax
predictions 9.79495 10.34862
TABLE 4
DeepCNN on legitimate test samples and on adversarial samples
without defensive distillation. Notice that the test accuracy and test
cross entropy loss deteriorate dramatically when tested on adversarial
examples generated by AdversarialCNN.
Without Defensive Distillation and
Adversarial Training
On legit samples On adversarial samples
Testing Cross
Entropy loss 0.05645 3.68216
Testing Accuracy 98.7650% 50.8859%
Testing F1 Score 0.98765 0.50886
Entropy of Testing
Softmax predictions 8.77761 8.42678
TABLE 5
DeepCNN on legitimate test samples and on adversarial samples with
defensive distillation with T=100. Notice that the test accuracy and test
cross entropy loss deteriorate less dramatically compared to the
network without defensive distillation
With Defensive Distillation and
Adversarial Training
On legit samples On adversarial samples
Testing Cross
Entropy loss 0.20855 0.40542
Testing Accuracy 98.2999% 91.4648%
Testing F1 Score 0.98299 0.91463
Entropy of Testing
Softmax predictions 9.23198 10.40873
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have built a complete pipeline for crafting
adversarial samples, building a deep Convolutional Neural
Network which achieves a near state-of-the-art test set ac-
curacy on GTSRB dataset, using the adversarial examples
to attack a near state-of-the-art network without any prior
knowledge of its architecture and building a more robust
neural network to be more resilient to those adversarial
examples. We have successfully crafted adversarial samples
on GTSRB dataset using Fast Gradient Sign Method and
Jacobian Saliency Map Method. Using those adversarial
samples, we were able to fool a different network in a black
box manner since we did not have access to the internal
weights and architecture of that network. Finally we have
successfully made that network more robust by defensive
distillation and adversarial training. Our work serves as
an aggregated implementation of work done by previous
literature on adversarial sample crafting and defense against
adversarial attack methods. Our work also differs form
previous work on adversarial sample crafting and defense
against adversarial samples in a way that we are aggregat-
ing, applying and verifying the previous methods in the
context of traffic signs rather than on MNIST or on CIFAR10
which is mostly used by previous literature [1] [3] [2].
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